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Abstract: This paper explores the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thes-
saloniki) for Yugoslav foreign policy-makers during the interwar period. It suggests 
that, apart from economic interests, namely securing trade facilities in the port and 
transport facilities offered by the Ghevgheli–Salonica railway connecting the Yugo-
slav territory with Salonica, there were security considerations which accounted for 
Belgrade’s special interest in this matter. These stemmed from two reasons — Serbia’s 
painful experience from the Great War on which occasion the cutting off of the route 
for Salonica had had dire consequences for the Serbian Army and the post-war stra-
tegic situation whereby Yugoslavia was nearly ringed by hostile and potentially hostile 
neighbours which was a constant reminder of the immediate past and made both po-
litical and military leadership envisage a potential renewed need to retreat to Salonica 
in a general conflict. The events prior to and during the Second World War seem to 
have vindicated such preoccupations of Yugoslav policy-makers. All the Great Powers 
involved in the conflict in the Balkans realised the significance attached to Salonica 
in Belgrade and tried to utilise it for their own ends. Throughout these turbulent 
events Prince Paul and his government did not demonstrate an inclination to exploit 
the situation in order to achieve territorial aggrandisement but rather reacted with 
restraint being vitally concerned that neither Italy nor Germany took possession of 
Salonica and thus encircled Yugoslavia completely leaving her at their mercy. 
Keywords: Salonica (Thessaloniki), free port, Yugoslavia, Greece, Balkans, railway, se-
curity, World War    
During the interwar period the port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) was of-ten mentioned in the foreign ministries of Greece and Yugoslavia as 
well as Great Powers. The concessions that Athens was prepared to grant to 
Belgrade in the matter of transit of goods and trade facilities was an impor-
tant item in the bilateral relations between the two countries. Moreover, the 
arrangements in connection with Salonica had wider ramifications affecting 
Balkan politics and thus drawing the attention of and interference from the 
interested Great Powers. For that reason, the nature of Yugoslav interest in 
Salonica and the place it had in Belgrade’s foreign policy is an issue that 
deserves a study of its own. So far it has been discussed in a thesis which 
made use of both Serbian/Yugoslav and Greek sources covering the four 
agreements on Salonica signed prior to and during the first decade follow-
ing the Great War, but lacked the sustained analysis of foreign policy im-
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plications.1 Another study focuses on the economic aspect of the Yugoslav 
free zone in this Aegean port.2 This paper looks beyond trade interests and 
examines security considerations that Salonica, or more specifically a free 
and unrestrained communication between the Yugoslav territory and that 
port, had for Yugoslav foreign policy. It suggests that these considerations 
were of paramount importance and informed that policy.    
To fully grasp the issue of Salonica it is necessary to review the his-
tory of its place in Serbo-Greek relations prior to the Great War. The eco-
nomic importance of Salonica for the pre-war landlocked Serbia grew in 
prominence since 1906 when she found herself engaged in a customs war 
with her powerful northern neighbour Austria-Hungary. In order to sur-
vive economic pressure applied by Vienna, Serbia had to find an alterna-
tive outlet for her export trade and she found it in the port of Salonica. 
After the First Balkan War (1912), Serbia hoped to gain access to the sea 
through the conquered Albanian territory, but Austria-Hungary thwarted 
her aspirations by the creation of an independent Albanian state. No won-
der then that at the time when new borders in the Balkans had not yet been 
decided, an economic expert, Milan Todorović, wrote a booklet in which he 
expounded the economic and political reasons for which Salonica should 
be granted to Serbia. “For Bulgaria and Greece”, Todorović argued, “this 
port would be — if I may use this expression — a luxury: they would pos-
sess one more port, but would not utilise it; for Serbia, on the other hand, 
Salonica is a dire necessity, a requisite for her economic independence.”3 It 
was not, however, until the acquisition of Serbian Macedonia (nowadays 
known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), as a result of the 
Balkan Wars, that Serbia’s southern border nearly reached Salonica; Ser-
bian territory now constituted a large part of the port’s hinterland and their 
interdependence grew accordingly. In fact, the deliberations of the London 
Peace Conference after the First Balkan War had still not been concluded 
when the Serbian delegate, Stojan Novaković, acting on instructions from 
his government, enquired of his Greek colleague, Eleftherios Venizelos, if 
Serbia could count on a free transit of goods, “livestock and war mate-
riel” included, through Salonica and the railway connecting that port with 
Serbia, and received a suitable assurance provided Greek sovereignty over 
1 A. Papadrianos, “Slobodna zona u Solunu i grčko-jugoslovenski odnosi 1919–1929. 
godine” (MA thesis, University of Belgrade, 2005). 
2 L. Kos, “Jugoslovenska slobodna luka u Solunu i njena ekonomska problematika” 
(PhD thesis, University of Belgrade, undated).  
3 M. Todorović, Solun i balkansko pitanje (Berlgrade: Štamparija “Simeun Mirotočivi”, 
1913), 60–61. 
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it was confirmed.4 It was not long before Greece and Serbia signed, on 1 
June 1913, a defensive alliance treaty for the purpose of keeping in check 
Bulgarian aggressive designs on the territories they acquired at the Otto-
man expense.5 On the basis of article 7 of that treaty Greece committed 
to guaranteeing full freedom of Serbian import and export trade through 
Salonica for 50 years provided Greek sovereign rights were not violated. In 
May 1914, the so-called Athenian convention was concluded stipulating 
the establishment of a free zone for Serbian trade in Salonica but it was 
never ratified due to the outbreak of the First World War.
The war transformed Serbia into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (Yugoslavia) with about twelve million inhabitants, which was 
marked for the position of a regional power in the Balkans. The new coun-
try had a long Adriatic coast and its most important trade partners were 
Italy and Austria in the north. In the circumstances, Salonica could not be 
of the same significance for the newly-founded Kingdom as she had been 
for pre-war Serbia. Nevertheless, the port still was a natural outlet for those 
parts of Yugoslavia which gravitated towards the ancient transport route 
down the Morava and Vardar valleys, namely for Southern Serbia. The war, 
the devastation it brought in its tail, the break-up of the old economic pat-
terns, and the new and as yet unsettled administration on both sides of the 
Yugoslav-Greek border caused a number of difficulties which hindered the 
free flow of goods between the two countries. The British Consul in Sa-
lonica, W. A. Smart, observed that due to the administrative incompetence 
and centralised nature of Greek authorities “the transit trade to Serbia has 
suffered severely… This obstruction has exasperated the Serbs and it is the 
4 Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti [Archives of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, hereafter ASANU], Milan Antić Papers, 14387/10367, Pašić to 
Novaković, 9 Jan. 1913, confidential no. 141; 14387/10369, Novaković to Pašić, 11 Jan. 
1913, confid. no. 148. 
5 H. Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Greek-Serbian Relations 1912–1913: Communication 
Gap or Deliberate Policy”, and A. I. Papadrianos, “Greco-Serbian Talks towards the 
Conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance in May 1913 and the Beginning of Negotiations 
for the Establishment of a Serbian Free Zone in Thessaloniki”, both in Balkan Studies 
45 (2004), 23–38, and 39–44 respectively. For more detail on Serbo-Greek relations 
during the Great War, see D. V. Dontas, “Troubled Friendship: Greco-Serbian Rela-
tions, 1914–1918”, in The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914–1918, ed. D. Djordjević (Santa 
Barbara: Clio Books, 1980), 95–124; M. Milošević, Srbija i Grčka 1914–1918: iz istorije 
diplomatskih odnosa (Zaječar: Zadužbina Nikola Pašić, 1997); D. T. Bataković, “Serbia 
and Greece in the First World War: An Overview”, Balkan Studies 45 (2004), 59–80.  
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despair of the Salonica merchant, who looks back regretfully to the facilities 
enjoyed in the days of Turkish rule.”6 
Furthermore, during and after the disastrous war against Kemal 
Atatürk’s forces in Asia Minor in 1919–1922, Greece found herself in a 
precarious state and many observers were doubtful whether she would be 
capable of holding on to some of her European provinces as well. Aegean 
Macedonia was predominantly populated by Slavs and could therefore be 
claimed on the basis of the nationality principle by either Yugoslavia or 
Bulgaria or both. The nationality principle could be compounded by eco-
nomic benefits of reaching the Aegean littoral. “It is difficult to believe that 
the vigorous Slav populations of the interior will permanently acquiesce in 
economic exclusion from the Aegean by a narrow strip of Greek coastland”, 
Smart ruminated in his report.7 He believed that the further decline of Sa-
lonica as an emporium and transit port for the Balkans might account “for 
the possibility that the Slav flood… may one day burst through unnatural 
economic dams and, descending to the Aegean, impose violently on Greece 
abdication of sovereignty”.8 
Consequently, the question of Salonica must be viewed in the light 
of the alleged aspirations of Yugoslavia towards Greek Macedonia in the 
wake of the war. There is some evidence that Serbian statesmen did not 
loose sight of the possibility, however remote it might have been, that this 
province could be absorbed in view of its ethnic composition. Nikola Pašić, 
the head of the Yugoslav delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, dis-
cussed with his Greek counterpart Venizelos relations between the Serbian 
and Greek Orthodox churches, which also involved educational facilities 
for their respective minorities. In this connection, he noted that “our people 
live in villages covering a large area around Salonica and, if Serbian schools 
and Slav liturgy were secured to them, they would be able to preserve [their 
identity] and wait for the time when they could join Serbia.”9 Yet, there is 
no credible evidence that Pašić and his People’s Radical Party ever pursued a 
definite policy which aimed at snatching the port from the Greeks. On the 
other hand, Vojislav Marinković, one of the leading figures of the Radicals’ 
rival Democratic Party and the future Foreign Minister (1924, 1927–1932), 
6 H. Andonov-Poljanski, “An Account of the Situation in Salonica and Coastal (Aegean) 
Macedonia in 1920 [facsimile of Smart to Granville, 25 March 1920]”, Godišen zbornik 
na Filozofskiot fakultet na Univerzitot vo Skopje 23 (1971), Annex, 15.   
7 Ibid. 24.  
8 Ibid. 25. 
9 M. Milošević & B. Dimitrijević, eds., Nikola Pašić – predsedniku vlade: strogo poverljivo, 
lično, Pariz, 1919–1920: Pašićeva pisma sa Konferencije mira (Zaječar: Zadužbina Nikola 
Pašić, 2005), no. 55, Pašić to Prime Minister, 11 Nov. 1919, confid. no.  4455, 136.  
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seems to have contemplated a more assertive policy towards Greece. In his 
notes on the general tasks of Yugoslav foreign policy he included a need 
to “reduce Greece to her real ethnographic frontiers”.10 His foreign policy 
programme is not dated but it is highly likely to have been made before the 
expulsion of the Greek population from their ancient homeland in Asia 
Minor as a result of the war and atrocities committed during the fighting 
against the Turkish nationalists and its resettling in the European parts of 
Greece. Hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees found their new home in 
Aegean Macedonia and thus considerably changed the ethnic structure of 
that region. Claims that Greece’s neighbours could have raised on the basis 
of the nationality principle thus irreversibly lost much of their strength.   
In addition, the minority question in regard to Macedonia entailed 
a controversy between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Both countries obtained a 
part of Macedonia after the successful war against the Ottoman Empire 
in 1912 but the division of spoils became a matter of dispute. Bulgaria was 
deeply dissatisfied with the extent of territory accorded to her and tried to 
redress her grievances by force of arms on two occasions — first by attack-
ing Serbia and Greece and thus initiating the Second Balkan War in 1913, 
and again during the First World War when she joined the Central Pow-
ers in their renewed aggression against Serbia in 1915. Both aggressions 
ended in a dismal defeat, but Bulgarian ambitions were not suppressed. In 
the post-1918 period, Sofia regarded Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarian na-
tional minority, requested from Belgrade and Athens to officially recognise 
them as such, and turned a blind eye to the terrorist campaign of the Inter-
nal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) which constituted 
something of a state within a state in the southern region of Bulgaria, from 
where Bulgarian neighbours were raided. The Bulgarian thesis clashed with 
that of Serbia, which claimed that Macedonian Slavs were of Serb origin. 
For that reason, Pašić was weary of the prospect of an agreement between 
Athens and Sofia whereby the former would “allow the opening of Bulgar-
ian schools in Serbo-Slav municipalities”.11 Such development would not 
just serve Greece to skilfully manoeuvre between the stronger Yugoslavia 
and the weaker Bulgaria but would also undermine, before the League of 
Nations and world public opinion, the position of the former in its dispute 
with the latter. In a similar vein, and again pointing to vague aspirations 
towards the Salonica hinterland, Živojin Balugdžić, Yugoslav Minister in 
Athens, contended that Yugoslavia had to be recognised as a natural guard-
ian of the Greek Slavs and cut the link between them — as well as Yugoslav 
10 ASANU, Vojislav Marinković Papers, 14439/434, “A plan for a state policy”, in man-
uscript and undated. 
11 See note 9.  
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Macedonians — and Bulgaria; otherwise, that population would seek its 
liberation “from the likes of [IMRO’s leader Todor] Aleksandrov rather 
than us”.12 The Greeks were fully alive to and weary of the potential irre-
dentist agitation which could be utilised against them and thus declined 
to recognise their “Slavophone” population as either Yugoslav or Bulgarian 
national minority.13 This anxiety accounted for the permanent fear in Athens 
that Yugoslavia, either alone or in alliance with Bulgaria, might invade the 
Aegean littoral, the former to occupy Salonica and the latter Dedeagatch 
and Kavalla.        
There was another consideration of an essentially strategic nature 
which determined Belgrade’s policy in regard to Salonica. It was derived 
from the painful experience of the Great War, more specifically from the re-
treat that the Serbian Army had to undertake in the fall of 1915 after having 
been exposed to the combined offensive of the much stronger Austro-Hun-
garian, German and Bulgarian forces. As it became clear that the retreating 
army would be driven out of Serbia, the plan was to withdraw southwards 
down the Vardar valley and join the Franco-British troops which had oc-
cupied Salonica and its surroundings.14 The Bulgarian attack in the rear cut 
the envisaged fallback route and compelled the Serbian army, accompanied 
by a considerable number of civilians, to retreat over the inhospitable Alba-
nian mountains under difficult winter conditions. The Serbs suffered heavy 
losses until they reached the coast and were transported by the Allied ship-
ping to the Corfu island. This traumatic collective memory was termed the 
“Albanian Calvary” and remained alive in the minds of policy-makers after 
the war. The recuperated Serbian Army launched, along with its French and 
British allies, an offensive from Salonica which ended not just in the libera-
tion of Serbia, but was also a decisive campaign of the war. “The Salonica 
front in the First World War left such a deep impression… in our army 
that it became an integral part of our struggle for liberation and unification 
and its history. Salonica entered into strategy and became an integral part 
of operational necessity of our army in defence of the country.”15 Such an 
impact was amplified by the strategic position of the new Yugoslavia which 
was surrounded from the west, north and east by hostile or potentially hos-
tile revisionist neighbours. The only frontiers that seemed safe were those 
12 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9099, Balugdžić to Ninčić, 24 Jan. 1923, confid. no. 21, 
subject: “Our schools in Greece”. 
13 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9109, Vukmirović to Ninčić, 29 Aug. 1925, confid. no. 
485.  
14 A. Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), 
252–253.
15 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8662, undated Antić’s note. 
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with the allied Romania and Greece. In addition, as early as during the Paris 
Peace Conference, Italy, the most dangerous neighbour, made sustained ef-
forts, later to be continued and crowned with success, to entrench herself in 
Albania at Yugoslavia’s flank. From the strategic point of view the Yugoslavs 
were frightened of the peril of the Italians “joining hands” from Albania 
with the Bulgarians across the Vardar valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cut-
ting off the vital Belgrade–Salonica railway in much the same fashion as the 
Bulgarian army had done in 1915.16 This consideration was central to Yu-
goslav strategic thinking and military planning. At the time of considerable 
tension in relations with Rome, Major Berthouart, French Military Attaché 
in Belgrade, was told by the Assistants of the Chief of the Yugoslav General 
Staff that neutralisation of Bulgaria would be a primary goal of the army 
in case of a general war even at the price of a temporary withdrawal at the 
western front against Italy.17 Another Military Attaché, Von Faber du Faur 
from Germany, was of opinion on the eve of the Second World War that 
Yugoslavia viewed Greece as a bridge to Britain which she did not want to 
burn and it was this consideration that informed the attitude towards Sa-
lonica.18 He was without doubt accurate in his assessment of the Yugoslav 
frame of mind.   
After the downfall of Venizelos, at the end of 1920, who demon-
strated good will to address Belgrade’s demands concerning better facilities 
in a free zone in Salonica, the Yugoslav government consulted the French 
Minister in Belgrade if it would be opportune to press Athens regarding 
that matter and transport between the port and the Yugoslav border on the 
basis of an international administration of the railway or territorial corri-
dor. The French were favourable to facilitating economic intercourse with 
the Mediterranean but made sure to discourage Yugoslavia from resorting 
to more forward policy.19 In November 1922, the French Supreme War 
Council examined the strategic importance of Salonica in war and peace, 
16 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, eds. Ljubodrag Dimić & Djordje Borozan, 2 vols. (Bel-
grade: Službeni list SRJ, Arhiv Jugoslavije & Vojnoistorijski institut, 1998), vol. II, no. 
14 [Foreign Minister] Dr Trumbić’s expose at the meeting of the allied Prime Ministers 
on 10 and 12 January 1920.
17 M. Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca/Jugoslavije, 1922–1935 (Bel-
grade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije), 220–221. 
18 Aprilski rat 1941, 2 vols. Vol. I, ed. Dušan Gvozdenović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski 
institut, 1969), vol. I, doc. 65, Report of the German Military Attaché in Belgrade of 21 
July 1939 on the military-political situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1 Oct. 
1935 to 1 July 1939.
19 D. Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923 (Belgrade: Institut za savre-
menu istoriju, 1979), 148. 
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and reached the conclusion that French interests coincided with those of 
Yugoslavia inasmuch as the realisation of the request for a free zone in that 
port would secure a corridor for France to supply military equipment not 
just to Yugoslavia but also to the other Little Entente countries and Po-
land.20 Perhaps it was not a coincidence that at about the same time the Yu-
goslav government raised the question of a Salonica convention and made a 
draft agreement. On that basis Živojin Balugdžić embarked on negotiations 
which resulted in the conclusion of the new convention about the “Serbian 
free zone in Salonica” on 10 May 1923.21 Just like ten years earlier, this 
agreement was part of a wider political understanding; it was accompanied 
by the renewal of the 1913 alliance treaty. However, neither the convention 
nor the treaty proved to be effective and long-lived. As for the practical ap-
plication of the former, there was a number of disputes over the unsettled 
questions such as the territorial enlargement of the zone, the interpretation 
of Yugoslavs rights in it, the exploitation of the railway connecting Salonica 
with Ghevgheli in Yugoslavia and technical issues pertaining to customs, 
veterinary control, telegraphic and docking services etc. One of many Ser-
bian export-traders, for example, who suffered from transport delays and 
difficulties on the Salonica–Ghevgheli railway — it took 10 to 15 days for 
wagons loaded with goods to traverse a distance of 77 km — complained 
to the Yugoslav Trade Chamber in Salonica about “a chaos in which a com-
plete indolence on the part of the respective Greek railway authorities to-
wards our trade interests is manifested”. The request was forwarded to the 
Athens Legation which appealed to the Greek government to secure the 
improvement of transport facilities.22    
On 14 November 1924, Yugoslavia denounced the alliance pact with 
Greece. This action was a result of the accumulated dissatisfaction in Bel-
grade: aside from the Free Zone and the Salonica–Ghevgheli railway issues, 
there were grievances over the expropriation of the Serbian Hilandar mon-
astery’s land, the status of a number of former Serbian/Yugoslav subjects 
in Salonica and their properties, but most of all over the act of concluding 
20 Ibid. 181.  
21 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9083, Antić’s memorandum on “Salonica zone”, 30 
Nov. 1923.
22 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia, hereafter AJ], Fond 379, The Legation of 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Greece, Athens, fascicle 2, file “Emigrants and Trans-
port”, Bogdanović to the Chamber of Commerce of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, 6 Sept. 1924; Stojanović (General Consulate) to Athens Legation, 10 Sept. 
1924; Stojanović (General Consulate in Salonica) to Athens Legation, 16 Oct. 1924, 
no. 1734; Athens Legation to General Consulate, 4 Nov. 1924, no. 993. A note of the 
Athens Legation and the reply of the Greek government are attached.   
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the Greco-Bulgarian protocol on minorities of 29 September 1924. By that 
convention Greece “made our political position in the Balkans more dif-
ficult in favour of Bulgaria against which our defensive alliance had been 
concluded”.23 More specifically, in reaching this agreement with Sofia, 
Greece conceded to regard the Slavs in Greek Macedonia, and by implica-
tion those in Yugoslav Macedonia, as ethnic Bulgarians and, in doing so, 
directly undermined the Serbian thesis as to the origin of the Macedonian 
Slav population which was central to Yugoslavia’s claim in her dispute with 
Bulgaria and the struggle against the IMRO. Facing Belgrade’s bitterness 
on account of the treaty, Athens denounced it although it had been filed 
with the League of Nations. As for Yugoslavia, she viewed the denounced 
alliance treaty with Greece as a practically unilateral obligation on her part, 
firstly because she did not truly believe that the unsettled Greece was capable 
of providing military support and secondly, because she even less believed 
that Athens would be willing to do so. In this connection, policy-makers in 
Belgrade never forgot how the Greeks had failed to fulfil their obligation 
under the 1913 treaty to come to the aid of Serbia when she had been at-
tacked by Bulgaria in 1915. In their view, if Yugoslavia were to guarantee 
Greek territory, she should obtain tangible concessions in return.  
The question of the Salonica free zone and the Ghevgheli–Salonica 
railway were reopened. Additional privileges were requested for the exploi-
tation of the zone in terms of the reduced control of Greek authorities over 
the transit trade in the port while ex-territorial rights were demanded for 
the railway administration.24 In the words of Foreign Minister, Momčilo 
Ninčić, since the possibility of utilising the free Salonica zone, paralysed 
to a large extent by the building of a Greek free zone around it, depended 
on the manner of exploitation of the Salonica–Ghevgheli railway, “we have 
asked for guarantees for the free transit on that railway insofar that its ex-
ploitation during a certain period of time would be transferred to the hands 
of our Railway Direction and thus achieved an administrative unity on the 
Belgrade–Salonica railway which per se presents a single traffic unit.”25 
23 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9043, Ninčić to Gavrilović (Athens), 10 Nov. 1924, 
no. 9652.  
24 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9056, Minutes of the plenary session held on Friday, 
22 May 1925, between the Yugoslav and Greek delegations; 14387/9057, Minutes of a 
plenary session held on 1 June 1925.
25 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9053, Ninčić to Paris, London, Rome, Warsaw, Bu-
charest, Prague, Athens and Sofia, 8 June 1925. To facilitate the takeover of the railway 
the Yugoslav government strengthened its hand by buying off the shares from the previ-
ous concessioner, the French Oriental Railways. See Antić Papers, 14387/9092, Ninčić 
to Paris, Warsaw and Bucharest Legations, 25 Nov. 1924. 
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Not surprisingly, Greece found these demands objectionable on account 
of their infringing on the sovereignty of the country. Ninčić expounded to 
the French Minister the reasons for Greek anxiety and Yugoslav policy in 
these terms:
The Greeks are always afraid, and do not hide their fear, that one day we 
might come to an agreement with the Bulgarians and take away Salonica 
and Kavalla respectively. If by getting the administration of the Salonica 
railway in our hands we completely secure our transit through our Salonica 
zone, Greece will be able to believe that we would not have any second 
thoughts in the future since we get from Greece what we really need, and 
we do not need new territories as we have them enough.26  
To make things more complicated, Yugoslav-Greek bickering became 
a part of the larger diplomatic initiative in the mid-1920s. In the wake of 
the Locarno agreement of October 1925, Britain promoted the conclusion 
of an agreement between the Balkan countries on the lines of that procured 
by Sir Austen Chamberlain between France and Germany.27 Greece tried 
to utilise this initiative to subsume the matters of dispute with Belgrade 
into the conclusion of a Locarno-like arbitration treaty arguing that a more 
friendly atmosphere created thereby would be conducive to the easier solu-
tion of all problems. The Yugoslav approach, on the contrary, was to resolve 
all the outstanding questions with Athens as a prerequisite for the success-
ful conclusion of an arbitration treaty.28 On the occasion of a parliamentary 
debate about the conclusion of a “Balkan Locarno”, Ninčić explained why 
he insisted to dispose of all bilateral questions prior to it: “The question of 
transit of our goods from Ghevgheli to Salonica is not a small matter for 
us. It is a question of our security and it is of first-rate importance and our 
requesting to have this question settled previously is not an excuse.”29 
Although the Foreign Minister did not enlarge on security impli-
cations, his utterance, in view of Yugoslav strategic considerations, was 
not an over-exaggerated statement. Yugoslavia was concerned to have an 
26 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9052, Ninčić to Gavrilović, 20 June 1925, strictly conf. 
no. 140. 
27 For more detail, see Dragan Bakić, “‘Must Will Peace: the British Brokering of ‘Cen-
tral European’ and ‘Balkan Locarno’, 1925–1929”, forthcoming in Journal of Contempo-
rary History. 
28 AJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-9-29, Gavrilović 
to Ninčić, 9 Jan. 1926, conf. no. 20. 
29 Momčilo Ninčić, Spoljna politika Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca: u god. 1925–
1926: govori, odgovori i ekspoze u Narodnoj skupštini (Belgrade: Makarije, 1926), A speech 
prior to voting on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 79th session 
on 26 March 1926, 69–82 (79).  
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absolutely secured route to Salonica along which she could transport war 
supplies on which she depended in case of war. The Great General Staff 
argued as late as November 1940 that the development of a war industry 
was a necessity with a view to overcoming dependence on foreign supplies, 
especially given the “great sensitivity of our only war communication link 
with abroad (through Salonica) which can be quickly cut due to the vicin-
ity to the border front.”30 In fact, in the mid-1920s Belgrade had military 
conventions stipulating that the railway branch leading to Salonica would 
be utilised for the transport of war supplies not just for Yugoslavia but, if 
need be, also for her Little Entente allies, Romania and Czechoslovakia, 
and even Poland. It should be noted that these plans bore the mark of the 
French military analysis of November 1922, which had suggested the use-
fulness of a Yugoslav-controlled corridor for such purposes. Milan Antić of 
the Foreign Ministry left no doubt on this score: “As far as the transit of 
ammunition and war materiel is concerned, in peace and war, it is necessary 
to insist to have such transport carried out without any Greek control and, 
in doing so, we could secure the functioning of the ammunition transit con-
vention with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania.”31 This request, in fact, 
constituted the chief reason behind the Yugoslav demand that all the goods 
in transit through Salonica be exempted from their custom declaration; in 
this way, war materiel could be obtained without Greek control.32 Sensing 
that the issue of war materiel transit was what perhaps most mattered to 
Belgrade, the Greeks argued that the best way to secure it in case of war 
was to make an alliance treaty between the two countries, as opposed to Yu-
goslav negotiators who insisted on settling the outstanding questions prior 
to the conclusion of a treaty. There is yet another indication that security 
concerns were not less important than those pertaining to trade interests. 
The economic importance of Salonica for Yugoslavia as a whole, with the 
noted exception of Southern Serbia, should not be overestimated. Statisti-
cal data for the 1921–1931 period showed that Greece took a fifth or sixth 
place (eighth in 1922) in the Yugoslav export and around twelfth place in 
the import trade. During those years the Greek share of the export trade 
never reached 10 percent while the maximum import from Greece fell short 
of 6 percent.33 
30 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 25, Report of the General Staff of 20 Nov. 1938 to the 
Minister of Army and Navy on unpreparedness of the armed forces and the necessity to 
grant additional material assets for the country’s preparation for war.  
31 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9691, Antić to Ninčić(?), 7 July 1926. 
32 Ibid. 
33 R. Perović, Solun i njegov privredni i saobraćajno-trgovinski značaj za Jugoslaviju (Bi-
tolj: Prosveta, 1932), 33–34. 
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On the Yugoslav side the negotiations were conducted by Antić, 
Panta Gavrilović, the Minister in Athens and Ranislav Avramović, a tech-
nical expert, but did not yield much result. As the Yugoslavs realised that 
the idea of putting the Salonica–Ghevgheli railway under direct control of 
Yugoslav administration was not likely to be materialised, they fell back on 
the reserve solution to form a mixed Yugoslav-Greco-French commission 
to administer it as it was expected that a French arbiter would be gener-
ally favourably disposed to Belgrade.34 France had, however, plans of her 
own and wanted to have full control over the railway and internationalise 
the Salonica dockyard. Antić was not happy with such alternatives for they 
could, notwithstanding the usefulness of French presence in the Balkans for 
Yugoslavia, “reduce our liberty of action” and make more difficult “penetra-
tion in the direction of south in the future.”35 Other proposals encompassed 
various forms of exploitation ranging from the administration of a private 
company, Greek exploitation with the guarantees of Great Powers to the 
League of Nations’ control over it.36 
On 17 August 1926 the agreement between Greece and Yugosla-
via was finally reached, comprising a political treaty of understanding and 
friendship and a set of conventions covering railway and transit questions, 
including the administration of the Ghevgheli–Salonica Railway, the Yu-
goslav free zone in Salonica and a minority convention. The Greek dictator 
General Alexander Pangalos’ generous concessions which satisfied all Yu-
goslav demands made this arrangement possible. Pangalos gave in as part of 
his strategy to settle relations with Yugoslavia in order to have free hands 
to re-conquer Thrace from the Turks. If this was his grand scheme, it would 
appear to have been thoroughly miscalculated, as Ninčić, according to the 
firsthand account of Antić, in March 1926 had asked the senior officials of 
the French Foreign Ministry whether it would be possible for Yugoslavia to 
attack Greece if she invaded Turkey without abrogating the League of Na-
tions’ Pact.37 However, there was no use of Papagos’ concessions. Just a few 
days after the signature of the agreement with Yugoslavia, the dictatorship 
of General Pangalos was overthrown in a revolution, and the new Greek 
government never ratified the agreement. The negotiations were resumed 
34 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9110, Avramović to Ninčić, subject: Ghevgheli–Sa-
lonica railway, 6 Nov. 1925; 14387/9680, Antić’s note, 4 July 1926; 14387/9691, Antić’s 
memo, 7 July 1926.
35 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9028, Antić’s note, 17 Nov. 1925. 
36 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/9018, Antić’s note, 26 Dec. 1925; 14387/9782, 
Avramović to Ninčić, 10 May 1926.   
37 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8993, undated Antić’s note. See also H. Psomiades, 
“The Diplomacy of Theodoros Pangalos, 1925–26”, Balkan Studies 13 (1972), 1–16. 
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with the new regime of Pavlos Kountouriotis, which made the dispute with 
Belgrade a national cause, and led nowhere. In such an atmosphere a mem-
orandum on Yugoslav-Greek relations concluded on a pessimistic note: “In 
the relations between us and the Greeks there is the psychosis of a fear 
of our descent on Salonica and the sensitivity that we do not respect the 
Greeks them being a small and weak state.”38 
It fell to Ninčić’s successor, Vojislav Marinković, to break the dead-
lock. He was remembered as Foreign Minister who had denounced the 
treaty with Greece in 1924 during his brief first term in office. On several 
occasions the Greeks offered the conclusion of a special convention which 
would secure a transit of war materiel but Marinković did not show much 
enthusiasm. The sharp deterioration in relations with Italy after Mussolini 
had concluded the first Pact of Tirana with the Albanian President, Ahmed 
Zogu, in November 1926, weakened Yugoslavia’s position in the Balkans. 
By contrast, Venizelos, once more in office in mid-1928, signed the agree-
ment with Mussolini in September that year thus breaking Greece’s dip-
lomatic isolation. On French urgings to settle the difficulties with Greece, 
Marinković at first replied that he wanted to either come to terms with 
Italy or conclude a pact with France previously.39 He apparently did not 
want to negotiate from the position of weakness. Although he had his pact 
with France in November 1927, it did not make any difference in regard to 
the negotiations with the Greeks. Moreover, Venizelos energetically refused 
to allow transport of war supplies for Yugoslavia as such provision would 
contravene his agreement with Italy. In the ensuing conversations between 
technical experts the “main” idea on the Yugoslav side was “to find a formula 
which would allow an import of our war materiel through the [Salonica] 
zone.” France advised Markinković  to conclude an agreement with Greece 
even at the price of considerable “sacrifices on our part.”40 Finally, the pact 
of friendship between Yugoslavia and Greece was concluded on 27 March 
1929 in Belgrade and accompanied by a protocol settling the outstanding 
questions in accordance with the Greek point of view. The dispute was off 
the table, Yugoslav-Greek relations were improved and Salonica would not 
be on the lips of statesmen for the next ten years until Italian aggressive 
designs in the Balkans brought it back in focus. 
Since late April 1938, Mussolini and Ciano started preparing the 
ground for the annexation of Albania. In order to realise their plans, it was 
38 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8779, Memorandum by Antić, 30 Dec. 1926, fol. 10. 
39 AJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-9-29, Memoran-
dum on the negotiations with Greece, fols. 6–7, undated, author unknown. 
40 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8996, Antić’s letter to an unknown person, undated; 
14387/8992, undated Antić’s note.  
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deemed necessary to obtain the consent, or even complicity, of Yugoslavia 
the good will of which had carefully been nurtured since Ciano had signed 
the Pact of Belgrade with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Stojadinović, 
on 25 March 1937. The cooperation between the two countries, in the Ital-
ian view, was regarded as a valuable lever for withstanding German pressure 
in the direction of the Adriatic in case of Anschluss and consequently seen 
as having potential to be a fundamental factor in the Danube and Balkan 
region. For these reasons, Stojadinović had to be approached and won over 
for the Italian plan, and the mission was to be undertaken by Ciano him-
self who had much personal sympathy for and a close working relationship 
with the Prime Minister. The Duce thought of an additional inducement 
for Stojadinović — the port of Salonica.41 Just three days before Ciano’s 
departure for Yugoslavia, the final decision was made “that it would not pay 
to gamble with our precious friendship with Belgrade to win Albania”; in 
order to attain an amicable consent of Yugoslavia, a fairly generous offer was 
prepared: “increase at the Yugoslav borders, demilitarisation of the Albanian 
borders, military alliance, and the absolute support of the Serbs in their 
conquest of Salonica.”42 
On 19 January 1939, Stojadinović and Ciano met at the Belje estate 
for a confidential conversation. The latter referred to the hostile attitude 
that Greece had taken towards Italy during the application of the League 
of Nations-imposed sanctions on account of the Italian aggression against 
Abyssinia which Rome would never forget. This was an opening to advance 
claim that Yugoslavia was in need of an access to the Aegean Sea and “she 
should take Salonica.” Moreover, Ciano proclaimed, “for that purpose, [Yu-
goslavia] can count on the full support of Italy: moral, political and military, 
if needed.”43 In a summary report sent to Prince Regent Paul, Stojadinović 
did not reproduce his answer to Ciano’s suggestion. In his memoirs, how-
ever, he recorded his stiff reply: 
41 Ciano’s Diary, 1937–1943: the Complete Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936–1943 (London: Phoenix, 2002), entry on 6 
Dec. 1938, 164; 8 Jan. 1939, 174–175. 
42 Ciano’s Diary, entry on 15 Jan. 1939, 178. Ciano had already spoken to Boško Hristić, 
the Yugoslav Minister in Rome, encouraging Yugoslav action towards Salonica, “the 
natural outlet of the Yugoslavs to the [Aegean] sea.” See entry on 24 Nov. 1938, 160. 
43 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, private, 20 Jan. 1939, Belje [digi-
tised] reel 4, 534–541 [range of scans]. Ciano made no reference to Salonica in Ciano’s 
Diplomatic Papers, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, transl. Stuart Hood (London: Odhams 
Press Limited, 1948), “The Report on my Journey to Yugoslavia and of the Conversation 
with the Prime Minister, Stoyadinovitch, 18th–23rd January, 1939 – XVII, 267–272. 
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The taking of Salonica from the Greeks would not constitute any sort of 
assuagement in the eyes of Yugoslav public opinion for the undertaking of 
the proposed operation in Albania. On the contrary, Greece is an ally of 
Yugoslavia, Serbo-Greek friendship was proven by the blood-shedding on 
the battlefields in the Balkan Wars as well as the World War. In the area 
[stretching] from Ghevgheli to Salonica, Greek governments settled pure 
Greek element, the refugees from Asia Minor… In the port of Salonica 
there is a free Yugoslav customs zone which functions well… All this 
speaks against the idea regarding Salonica.44 
According to Stojadinović, the Yugoslav military was of opinion that 
no effort should be spared to prevent Italy from subduing Greece; if, how-
ever, a war became inevitable and a victorious Italy got hold of Salonica, it 
was necessary to prevent her, “either by means of an agreement or at the cost 
of war”, from maintaining control of the port for such contingency would 
amount to “the collapse of the economic lung through which Yugoslavia 
breathes i.e., a free sea route.”45 In the end, nothing of these Italo-Yugoslav 
exchanges materialised. Prince Paul removed Stojadinović from the office 
which brought about the end of an era of friendly relations between the 
two Adriatic neighbours. Italy decided to proceed with the annexation of 
Albania without regard to, and if necessary against, Yugoslavia. Indeed, on 7 
April 1939, Italian troops disembarked on the Albanian coast and occupied 
the whole country. In the circumstances, there was no question of any com-
pensation for Belgrade in Albania or still less at the expense of Greece. Nor 
was such compensation in the realm of practical policy, given the attitude 
of Prince Paul who would never enter any combination with Mussolini if it 
meant becoming an accomplice in the latter’s aggressive enterprises.  
This was not the end of the troubles caused by Rome, however, and 
Yugoslavia would soon again find herself in a strategically dangerous situa-
tion. On 28 October 1940, Mussolini attacked Greece and spread the the-
atre of the Second World War to the hitherto peaceful Balkans. One of 
the primary objectives of the Italian offensive was to take possession of 
Salonica and it was this consideration that most alarmed Belgrade. On the 
very day the war started, the Crown Council held a meeting to decide on 
the attitude to be adopted. Prince Paul spoke first and set the tone of the 
discussion when he put forward a proposal to mobilise troops in the south 
in the vicinity of the Greek border. “We cannot allow Italy to enter Salonica. 
This [situation] cannot be endured any more… It is better to die than loose 
44 M. Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 
1970), 518.
45 Ibid. 
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honour”, the Regent was agitated.46 The Prime Minister, Dragiša Cvetković, 
supported Prince Paul’s view and expressed willingness to fight at any cost, 
and to withdraw if necessary, although he did not specify in which direction 
the army might retreat. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister Aleksan-
dar Cincar-Marković was not in favour of heroic solutions. He asked what 
would become of those left behind the retreating army and declared himself 
against rash decisions, including mobilisation. Cincar-Marković underlined 
that Germany stood by Italy and concluded: “We cannot wage war against 
them.” The Minister of War, General Milan Nedić, thought that the main 
question was what the German attitude would be and warned that a partial 
mobilisation might lead the country to war. Finally, Milan Antić, now the 
Minister of Court, was the most outspoken and diplomatically cautious: 
he advised the wait-and-see attitude as the further course of war in Greece 
and Germany’s stance could largely depend on “English support and Tur-
key’s attitude”. Prince Paul seemed “very depressed” but there was no final 
decision. During the conversation with Antić the next day, the Regent re-
vealed his inner torments when he stated that he could not be requested 
to attack the country of his wife, Princess Olga, who was a granddaughter 
of King George I of Greece. Antić had to calm him down and explain the 
rationale behind the Yugoslav policy: “No one thinks of attacking Greece, 
but we are all in agreement that we cannot have Italy in Salonica. In the 
final instance, it is better for Greece herself to have us instead of Italy in 
Salonica.”47 Cincar-Marković was then called to join their discussion and it 
was decided to entrust Milan Perić, the director of the news agency Avala, 
with the mission of soliciting the views of Walter Gruber of the German 
agency Deutsches Nachrichten Büro in Belgrade and Josef Hribovsek-Berge, 
the German press attaché. An informal communication with these men — 
who apparently performed important intelligence operations — had been 
going on for some time, and, in fact, Gruber had phoned General Nedić on 
the day Italy had declared war on Greece informing him that the Yugoslavs 
would be invited to descend on Salonica. According to Perić, Gruber sug-
gested that “[we] should moot the question of Salonica in Berlin. He asks 
[us] what we are waiting for?” On the basis of Perić’s information, Cincar-
Marković and General Nedić were to prepare a telegram for the Military 
Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, and instruct him to sound 
out the opinion in the highest German military circles. It was also decided 
46 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 293, Minutes by the Minister of Court, Milan Antić, on 
28 and 31 Oct. and 1 Nov. from the meeting of the Crown Council in connection with 
the question of Salonica. 
47 Ibid. 
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to concentrate additional troops at the Greek border.48 The meeting was 
concluded with Prince Paul’s remark “that he should be understood, that he 
sacrifices himself for the interests of the country, although he find it difficult 
to conceive that he has to work against his wife’s country, which is also an 
ally.”49 The decisions reached were acted upon. By 6 November 1940, nine 
infantry divisions were mobilised for the purpose of advancing to Salonica, 
if ordered so, and securing this operation from the direction of Bulgaria.50 
It is clear from the information provided by Perić that the initia-
tive for Salonica’s passing to Yugoslav hands came from the German side. 
Furthermore, the pro-German Minister for Physical Education in the 
Cvetković Cabinet, Dušan Pantić, had an interesting conversation over 
dinner with two distinguished German diplomats, Ambassador in Rome, 
Ulrich Hassel, and Minister in Belgrade, Viktor von Heeren, which threw 
some light on the reasons which might have guided Berlin in its prodding 
of Belgrade’s aspirations in the port’s direction. The former diplomat un-
derscored that the Third Reich considered the Vardar valley together with 
Salonica to be “the aorta artery of Yugoslavia, and the Serbian part of the 
people in particular” and expressed German willingness to transfer Salonica 
with its hinterland to Yugoslavia. Pantić had an impression that “our even-
tual taking of the territory, even provisional, would be a guarantee for the 
German Reich against the eventual creation of a Salonica front on the part 
of England and that in such case Germany would even remain an observer 
of the Italo-Greek conflict and regard it as a local war conflict.”51 He had 
no doubt that Hassel’s and Heeren’s suggestions were authorised by their 
superiors. Pantić discussed this matter with Prince Paul the next day and 
48 Ibid. See also ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8509, 8512, undated Antić’s notes im-
plying that General Nedić may have overstepped a simple indication to the Germans as 
to the military-strategic importance of Salonica for Yugoslavia. 
49 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 293. It should be noted that the editor has commented 
(n. 8), in blatant disregard for the content of this document, not to mention the wider 
context of Yugoslavia’s situation, but typical of the biased view of communist Yugoslav 
historiography, that Prince Paul decided to “traitorously attack Salonica justifying such 
an action by the alleged interests of the country”.
50 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 294, Order of the Minister of Army and Navy of 2 Nov. 
1940 for the activation of war regiments for the purpose of eventual occupation of 
Salonica; doc. 296, Directive of the Minister of Army and Navy of 5 Nov. 1940 to the 
Chief of the General Staff which authorises in principle the project of mobilisation and 
concentration of forces for an attack on Salonica and orders further measures for the 
realisation of this project; doc. 297, Order of the Minister of Army and Navy of 6 Nov. 
1940 for the activation of all as yet unactivated units, commands and facilities of the 
Third Army’s area of responsibility and some units from the Fifth Army’s area.  
51 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 293, n. 8.
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made plain his view that the time had come to definitely arrange relations 
with Germany. He proposed a diplomatic initiative in Athens to obtain a 
voluntary cession of Salonica at least until the end of the war in order to 
prevent the spreading of the conflict in the Balkans.52 He did not record 
Prince Paul’s reply to his suggestion but it is safe to assume that the latter 
was not receptive to it.      
Colonel Vauhnik carried out his orders discussing the Salonica 
issue with two high-ranking officers and reported them to have been rather 
evasive. They waited for further Italian military operations in Greece and 
promised to provide an answer in a few days. Vauhnik added that he found 
the Germans “disinterested in the Italo-Greek conflict and even pleased 
that things were going badly for the Italians.”53 After the resignation of 
General Nedić on 6 November 1940, Vauhnik informed the Germans that 
he had dropped the Salonica matter and was not likely to raise it again.54 
At about the same time, there was another seemingly unofficial sound-
ing of German position as to Salonica. Danilo Gregorić, Director of the 
Vreme newspapers known for his pro-German leanings, was received in the 
German Foreign Ministry. He talked of rapprochement between Berlin and 
Belgrade, their intense economic cooperation, and hinted at the importance 
of the Greek port which in the hands of Italians would be “a noose around 
the neck of Yugoslavia”.55 The origins of Gregorić’s meddling in this matter 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., n. 6 which contains the transcripts of the two telephone conversations with 
Colonel Vauhnik on 4 and 5 Nov. 1940 relaying the content of his discussions with 
German military officials. These transcripts were originally published in Radoje 
Knežević, “Kako se to zbilo”, Poruci 4–5, pp. 6–7, published by an emigrant organisation 
in London. In his memoirs, V. Vauhnik, Nevidljivi front: Borba za očuvanje Jugoslavije 
(Munich: Iskra, 1984), 164–168, has revealed that he thought that the order he received 
from Belgrade was a manoeuvre on the part of an informal group of officers, perhaps 
without the knowledge of the Minister of Army and in conjunction with certain civilian 
circles, which could saddle the country with “a political adventure.” He even doubted 
that it could be made a part of a deal whereby Yugoslavia would have to adhere to the 
Tripartite Pact and cede Slovenia (Vauhnik was Slovenian) to the Reich in exchange for 
Salonica. Therefore, Vauhnik made enquires in the German headquarters in such man-
ner as to underscore that, despite feelers put out by some of his countrymen, Yugoslavia 
did not make any sort of claim on the port although she insisted that it did not pass to 
anyone else, and least of all Italy. He, in fact, sabotaged what he believed to be a shady 
business of an irresponsible clique in Belgrade.      
54 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 304, Report of an official of the Political Department of 
11 Nov. 1940 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany about Yugoslav aspirations 
towards Salonica. 
55 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 305, Report of Dr. Smith of 12 Nov. 1940 to Ribbentrop 
on conversation with Danilo Gregorić.   
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are not clear. Whereas he confessed to his German interlocutor that he had 
had a long conversation with Cvetković and Cincar-Marković before his 
departure for Berlin and thus created an impression of acting upon instruc-
tions from his government, the latter flatly denied it to the Reich Minister 
in Belgrade.56 Yet, Gregorić went to Berlin again less than two weeks later 
and was this time received by Ribbentrop himself, which suggests that he 
did not act without authorisation.57 Gregorić later confided to Antić that 
Cvetković had also conversed with von Heeren about Salonica and prom-
ised to meet all German demands in return for a favourable solution of 
this question, but it remained unclear if the Regent had been familiar with 
it.58 In Antić’s view, such initiative was incompatible with Yugoslav foreign 
policy which, once forced to accept negotiations for joining the Tripartite 
Pact, endeavoured to extract maximum concessions from the Germans with 
a view to securing the independence, integrity and neutrality of the country. 
The Salonica matter came under discussion “without Cvetković’s interven-
tion, in a hypothetical form, for the purpose of defending the vital interests 
of our country, in case of Central Powers’ [sic] victory, so that Italy, Bulgaria 
did not enter Salonica, or an unfavourable international solution for us was 
imposed”, Antić explained.59  
Von Heeren closely observed the mood of the government in Bel-
grade and found that the Salonica issue was revived due to the Italo-Greek 
war and the consequent uncertainty as to the future territorial extent of 
Greece. In his analysis, “earlier, this old political objective was silenced over, 
and only because it is in contradiction with the anti-revisionist attitude in 
principle for which the official Yugoslav foreign policy always stood for, 
and also because it seemed bearable to have Salonica in the hands of the 
Greek partner in the Balkan Entente”.60 Italian conquest of the port would 
be regarded as the completion of a military encirclement of Yugoslavia and 
56 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 318, Heeren’s Report of 24 Nov. 1940 to Ribbentrop 
relating to the impending visit of Cincar-Marković to Germany. 
57 D. Gregorić, Samoubistvo Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Luč, 1942), 105–129. If Antić’s rec-
ollection can be trusted, Gregorić, whom he met in a prison of communist Yugoslavia 
after the war and found him superficial, garrulous and too close to Germans, had been 
chosen for a mission to Berlin by Cvetković, while Cincar-Marković unsuccessfully 
tried to oppose his meddling in the ongoing negotiations. See ASANU, Antić Papers, 
14387/9545, Antić’s notes, fols. 81–82, 167.  
58 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8509, 8512, undated Antić’s notes.  
59 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/8512, undated Antić’s note. 
60 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 307, Report of the German Minister in Belgrade of 14 
Nov. 1940 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the increased interest of Yugoslavia for 
an outlet to the Aegean Sea through Salonica. 
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resisted with force of arms, if necessary, and provided Germany did not 
interfere. Von Heeren predicted that Belgrade would hesitate even to speak 
about the possession of Salonica as long as it remained Greek, but would 
disinterest itself in the fate of Greece if both Axis powers recognised the 
Yugoslav right to have Salonica which had previously been detached from 
Greece. Furthermore, he believed that a promise to that effect could be de-
cisive for the permanent soothing of relations between the Serbs and their 
Italian and Bulgarian neighbours. 
Von Heeren’s views and the Yugoslav soundings in Berlin apparently 
made impression on Hitler himself. While discussing with Ciano the posi-
tion in the Balkans in relation to the Italo-Greek war, he asked for Italy’s 
consent to neutralise Yugoslavia by offering her a territorial guarantee and 
Salonica; after having consulted Mussolini, Ciano agreed.61 Hitler then 
turned to make a deal with the Yugoslavs. He received Cincar-Marković 
and tried to wring from him Yugoslav adherence to a non-aggression pact 
with both Axis powers.62 The Führer exploited the animosity between Rome 
and Belgrade, and insisted that the moment was extremely favourable for 
the latter to define its relations with the Axis and secure a place in the 
new European order. Germany was presently capable of demanding Italy’s 
respect for such an arrangement on account of the military help he was 
prepared to provide in the Balkans following the Italian failure in the Greek 
campaign. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s access to the Aegean would reduce the 
tension in the Adriatic where Italy was very sensitive for military reasons. 
Hitler’s offer of Salonica did not meet with an enthusiastic response on the 
part of Cincar-Marković. On the contrary, he seems to have attempted to 
dissuade Hitler from involving himself in the Balkans by pointing out that 
the formation of a Salonica front by the British was a mere rumour not to 
be taken seriously.63 
The Yugoslavs maintained their reserved attitude towards the Axis 
and thus remained an unknown quantity for them in relation to the cam-
paign in Greece that the Wehrmacht planned for the spring. “It cannot be 
predicted whether Yugoslavia would join a German attack reaching for Sa-
lonica”, read an estimate of the German Supreme Command of the Armed 
61 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 312, Minutes of the conversation between Hitler and 
Ciano on 18 Nov. 1940 in Obersalzberg about the situation in the Mediterranean and 
the Balkans; doc. 314, Minutes of the conversation between Ciano and Hitler on 20 
Nov. 1940 in Vienna about combinations with Yugoslavia due to the Italo-Greek con-
flict. 
62 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 323, Minutes of the conversation between Hitler and 
Cincar-Marković in the Berghof on 29 Nov. 1940.  
63 Ibid. 
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Forces.64 The Belgrade government was, however, far from contemplating 
any such action. On the contrary, it refused Italian and even German re-
quests to permit military transports for Italian forces in Albania across Yu-
goslav territory and, moreover, secretly supplied hundreds of thousands of 
hand grenades, artillery fuses and horses for the Greek cavalry.65 In doing 
so, Yugoslavia helped Greece defeat the Italians and drive them back to 
Albania. Nevertheless, Italian debacle made German military intervention 
inevitable. With it, Belgrade fully realised it would be faced with the oner-
ous demands on the part of Germany. In order to pre-empt German request 
for Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, a special emissary of Prince 
Paul, Vladislav Stakić, a lawyer of the Italian Legation in Belgrade, visited 
Rome twice during February 1941 to find out whether it would be pos-
sible to reach some arrangement with Italy and obviate German pressure. 
Mussolini proposed a new alliance pact between the two countries and of-
fered Yugoslavia the port of Salonica once again as well as the exchange of 
population — the Yugoslav minority in Istria for the Albanian minority in 
Kosovo — but his offers were declined.66 In his memoirs, Stakić recorded 
how Mussolini had even warned him that the Germans would take Sa-
lonica unless Yugoslavia had it, and specified that the negative answer had 
been given due to Prince Paul’s adamant stance against taking part in the 
partition of an allied country.67 Besides, at this point it became clear that if 
an agreement counted for anything, it had to be made with Berlin. 
In mid-February 1941, German pressure was mounting. Both Prime 
Minister Cvetković and Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković were invited 
to Salzburg to meet Hitler and Ribbentrop. The Yugoslavs were interested 
in mediating for the purpose of liquidating the Italo-Greek war and then 
creating a diplomatic instrument which would oblige all Balkan countries 
to resist any foreign power to use their territories for military operations. 
They were not too hopeful as to Hitler’s reception of such a proposal and 
struggled to fathom German intentions. Cincar-Marković concluded: 
But one thing is beyond any doubt: a descent of the Germans southwards 
across Bulgaria means a mortal danger for us because the natural, shortest 
and best route between Germany and the coast of the Aegean Sea leads 
through our country. Therefore we cannot consent to any suggestion which 
would give Salonica to the Germans. Once they obtain Salonica, they will 
64 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. I, doc. 332, Information of the German Supreme Command of 
the armed forces of 21 Dec. 1940 on German military preparations in the Balkans. 
65 J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941 (New York: Columbia University 
Press), 190–192.
66 Ibid. 208–209, 211–212. 
67 V. Stakić, Moji razgovori sa Musolinijem (Munich: Iskra, 1967), 99–100, 105. 
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strangle us completely. It is better for us if they directly attack us rather 
than torment us isolated. For even if our end would be the same in both 
cases, the path would not be the same. In case of an attack and resistance 
our honour would be saved and that will mean something at the moment 
of a liquidation of this war.68 
It is difficult to find a more obvious and straightforward statement 
as to the vital strategic importance attributed to Salonica by high-ranking 
Yugoslav officials. In the event, Cincar-Marković and Cvetković were re-
quested to sign the Tripartite Pact but did not accept it. They were asked to 
relay an invitation to the Prince Regent to come and see Hitler. This visit 
took place in Berghof on 4 March 1941. Prince Paul was clearly given to 
understand that Yugoslavia was requested to join the Tripartite Pact in or-
der to provide evidence of her loyal attitude. Hitler also dangled a prospect 
of granting Salonica to Yugoslavia at the end of the war.69 Two days later, 
the Crown Council met in Belgrade to make a decision. It was decided to 
open negotiations with the Germans but to insist on the maintenance of 
Yugoslavia’s armed neutrality and the exclusion of Yugoslav territory from 
transit of troops. 
When Cincar-Marković secured the acceptance of these conditions, 
another meeting of the Crown Council was convened on 12 March. At this 
point, the Minister of Court, Milan Antić, knowing that the Salonica is-
sue had already been mooted by General Nedić with the German military 
(and still not knowing about Cvetković’s conversations on this subject) and 
aware of the Italian ambitions voiced by the fascist press, which ran contrary 
to the vital Yugoslav interest not to tolerate an entrenchment in the port 
of any other power except Greece, raised the matter of Salonica.70 In the 
ensuing discussion Ivo Perović, a co-Regent of Prince Paul, was the most 
determined and professed that Salonica would be worth a war with Italy. 
Finally, it was decided to discuss the fate of Salonica with the Germans in 
68 AJ, Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 138-1-526, Cincar-Marković’s 
memorandum of 13 Feb. 1941 prepared for Cvetković, published online in V. Djurić-
Mišina, Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1941, downloaded from http://27march.org/images/
File/Veljko_Djuric_Kraljevina_Jugoslavija_1941_lat.pdf.
69 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. II, ed. Antun Miletić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1987), 
doc. 53, Report of the German Foreign Minister to the Minister in Belgrade of 7 March 
1941 on the conversation between Prince Paul and Hitler in the Berghof. 
70 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/10487, Antić’s note, undated. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in 
Crisis, 228–229, claims that Cincar-Marković and Antić consulted on the matter. Al-
legedly, the latter was emotionally attached to Salonica because of his role in the nego-
tiations of 1925–26 and the former exceeded Cvetković’s instructions when he insisted 
in his talks with the Germans on a territorial link with Salonica rather than on a free 
access.    
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case it did not remain under Greek sovereignty after the war. Following 
another round of negotiations, the Germans, having procured Mussolini’s 
consent, agreed to provide assurances to Belgrade as to Salonica. According 
to Antić, Cincar-Marković submitted a draft note to the Crown Council 
which found it “not clear and precise enough” and the Foreign Minister was 
instructed to ask for another redaction, “always hypothetical and only in the 
case [Salonica] cannot not stay in Greek hands after the war.”71 Cincar-
Marković carried out his instructions successfully. The final text of the secret 
note reads as follows: “On the occasion of a new delimitation of borders in 
the Balkans the interest of Yugoslavia for a territorial link with the Aegean 
Sea and the extension of her sovereignty to the town and port of Salonica 
will be taken into account.”72 Prince Paul still had doubts about the word-
ing of the Salonica note and Antić reassured him that it was not directed 
against Greek interests which could be endangered by the belligerents alone. 
The Regent’s crisis of conscience was all the more striking in the light of 
Hitler’s interpreter Paul Schmidt’s impression that “the Yugoslavs seemed 
to have no special interest in Salonica, with which Germany had baited the 
hook.”73 The note constituted one of the four notes which accompanied the 
text of the Tripartite Pact signed by Yugoslavia on 25 March 1941. The note 
on Salonica remained secret, that on Yugoslavia’s abstention from military 
operations was not to be published without the prior consent of both sides, 
whereas the notes pertaining to the guarantee of Yugoslavia’s integrity and 
sovereignty and the exclusion of her territory from transports of troops and 
war materiel were announced.     
It is interesting to note that the Salonica affair during those fateful 
days became a matter of bitter dispute between the Serb emigrants after the 
war. Deprived of the possibility of returning to the now communist Yugo-
slavia, they were sharply divided into the defenders of Prince Paul and his 
regime and the supporters of the 27 March coup d’état. Radoje Knežević, 
one of the political architects of the putsch, and thus having a vested inter-
est in denouncing Prince Paul, went as far as accusing the Regent of signing 
the Tripartite Pact in a simple exchange for Hitler’s promise to let Yugo-
slavia have Salonica. This accusation, equally groundless as that of Yugoslav 
communist historiography, was vehemently refuted by Dragiša Cvetković.74 
71 ASANU, Antić Papers, 14387/10487, Antić’s note, undated.
72 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. II, doc. 114, Note of the German government of 25 March 
1941 to Dragiša Cvetković guaranteeing the extension of sovereignty to the town and 
port of Salonica. 
73 Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 239, n. 67. 
74 R. L. Knejevitch, “Prince Paul, Hitler, and Salonica”, International Affairs 27/1 ( Jan. 
1951), 38–44; the reply is given in Dragisha Tsvetkovitch, “Prince Paul, Hitler, and 
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His friend, Časlav Nikitović, wrote him a letter informing him of the histo-
rian Jacob Hoptner’s difficulties to ascertain the Yugoslav attitude towards 
Salonica in view of the Croat leader Vlatko Maček’s differing accounts and 
Count Ciano’s note of what transpired between the government and the 
Germans as to the port’s fate. Nikitović thought that it was necessary to 
explain that the Crown Council had endeavoured to ensure free access to 
the Aegean, which Yugoslavia had already enjoyed under the existing ar-
rangement with Greece, rather than to take the city from the Greeks.75 
Božidar Purić, a former high-ranking diplomat, was also engaged in fight-
ing off Knežević’s accusations regarding Salonica in the pages of the Serb 
émigré journal Kanadski Srbobran, and kept Prince Paul up to date on this 
matter.76 He compounded the classic strategic reason of holding Salonica 
in order to keep Italy out of it by another calculation which, according to 
him, was not far from the thoughts of Yugoslav officials at the time: “After 
the experience of Czechoslovakia’s and Romania’s fate following the Vienna 
meeting [Awards], it had to be clear to us that, in case of German victory, 
the question of Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia would be resolved in favour 
of Germany’s and Italy’s interests, and that Salonica would be a sole outlet 
to sea for us.”77 This argument, which had never been previously mentioned 
in documents or by the participants in the events, points out to an exclu-
sively Serbian concern based on the worst case scenario of Yugoslavia’s dis-
memberment through detaching Croatian and Slovenian, to a great extent 
coastal, areas which would reverse the position of Serbia to that of the pre-
1914 landlocked state. In Purić’s view, it justified Antić’s initiative for the 
German assurance with regard to Salonica. The whole post-war controversy 
as to what was Yugoslav stance in those critical moments, he believed, was 
caused by Cvetković’s inconsistent claims relating to Salonica — whether 
it had been offered to and imposed on the Yugoslavs or demanded by them 
from Berlin.  
As the German pressure mounted in March 1941, Yugoslavia was 
also faced with the British endeavours to enlist her to the anti-German 
camp. This was a change in attitude that had been taken since the outbreak 
of the war. During the “phoney war” phase, France, and in particular Gen-
eral Maxim Weygand, the commander of the French forces stationed in 
Syria, was bent on the creation of a Salonica front in the Balkans which 
he believed, no doubt invoking the successful French-led campaign in the 
previous war, to have potential to decisively contribute, provided that Bal-
Salonica”, International Affairs 27/4 (Oct. 1951), 463–469. 
75 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, 7/737-741, Nikitović to Cvetković, 9 May 1958. 
76 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, 8/764, Purić to Prince Paul, 4 April 1963. 
77 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, 8/758-761, Purić to Prince Paul, 22 Jan. 1962 (?). 
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kan nations sided with the Allies, to the final German defeat.78 To this end, 
the French military maintained regular contacts with the General Staffs of 
Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania. The British, however, discouraged Wey-
gand’s schemes: they could have brought about the end of the Italian non-
belligerence which was, in view of London, a more valuable asset than the 
vague prospect of a Salonica front.79 Instead, Britain promoted the idea of 
a neutral Balkan bloc in which Bulgaria would forego her territorial aspi-
rations and show solidarity with her neighbours organised in the Balkan 
Entente formed in 1934 and which would perhaps be led by the still neutral 
Italy. Politically unrealistic, such combination clearly indicated the para-
mount importance accorded to Rome, and at least was not as divorced from 
the military realities on the ground as Weygand’s plan. With the French 
military disaster in May–June 1940 and Italy’s entry into war, both strate-
gies were put to rest. 
In March 1941, Britain was preoccupied with the precarious situa-
tion of Greece which was about to be invaded by Hitler. Without resources 
to provide effective help himself, Churchill tried to organise a new variant 
of a Salonica front which would consist of Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish 
forces with only a token British participation. In order to realise this plan, 
the British exerted all the influence they commanded on the Anglophile 
Prince Paul. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, strove to persuade him 
that the Germans were about to encircle Yugoslavia and so seal her fate. 
“As we see it, Germany’s objective in the Balkans is to subdue Greece and 
to immobilise Turkey. If Germany could achieve these dual objects and in 
the course of so doing occupy Salonica and dominate the straits, Yugoslavia 
would be at Germany’s mercy.”80 In fact, this was the only concrete strategic 
reason that Eden could provide as to the necessity for Yugoslavia of tak-
ing up arms and resisting Hitler; the rest was but a pathetic appeal to “the 
soul of a people… splendid traditions and brave deeds” and the prospect of 
facing “the future with the greater courage and hope”.81 Barely a fortnight 
later, Eden prodded the Prince Regent to withstand German pressure and 
even suggested that the Yugoslav Army should take initiative and attack 
the Italian forces in Albania — which would soon be defeated — captur-
78 A. Papagos, Grčka u ratu (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1954), 51–52, 99, 105. 
79 E. Barker, Britanska politika prema jugoistočnoj Evropi u Drugom svjetskom ratu (Za-
greb: Globus, 1978), 28–35 – a Serbo-Croat translation of British Policy in South-East 
Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan Press, 1975); V. Vinaver, “Vojno-
politička akcija fašističke Italije protiv Jugoslavije u jesen 1939. godine”, Vojnoistorijski 
glasnik 3 (1966), 73–94, esp. 76–78.
80 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, 2/28-33, Eden to Prince Paul, 4 March 1941.  
81 Ibid. 
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ing large quantities of war supplies in the process.82 The Salonica card was 
also emphasised in a communication made by the British Minister, Ronald 
Campbell, to Prime Minister Cvetković. Realising the imminence of an 
agreement between Belgrade and Berlin, the former requested from the 
Yugoslav government to insist on Germany’s obligation to refrain from at-
tacking the port. “Such an assurance can easily be valueless, but if Germany 
gives it and later menaces Salonica, Yugoslavia will be fully justified to cross 
her borders”, Campbell argued.83 This was another, albeit more subtle, at-
tempt to recruit Yugoslavia as bulwark to German descent on Greece. If it 
proved ineffective, which might have seemed highly likely to the British, it 
could have provoked Berlin to resorting to more forward measures and con-
sequently brought Belgrade in the conflict. Just like Germany, Britain used 
the bait of Salonica to make Yugoslavia do its bidding. London encouraged 
Prince Paul’s government to revive the Salonica front presenting it as the 
only way for Yugoslavia to preserve her independence.  
Despite all British warmongering and his personal feelings, Prince 
Paul had to acknowledge political and military realities and Yugoslavia 
signed the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941 but without the military claus-
es which for all practical intents and purposes left Belgrade in the position 
of a neutral. Two days later, the irresponsible group of high-ranking officers 
abused the anti-German sentiment of Serbian population and carried out a 
putsch against Prince Paul and his government. Hitler promptly responded 
by attacking Yugoslavia and destroying her as a country. In the short-lived 
April War, the strategic significance of the Vardar valley leading to Salonica 
was once more demonstrated — though being far from a decisive moment 
— since German troops made it one of their primary objectives to cut this 
line of communication and thus prevent the Yugoslav Army from with-
drawing down that route and making contact with Greek forces. 
In conclusion, this review of Yugoslav policy towards the Salonica 
issue argues that, along with economic interest, and perhaps more than that, 
Belgrade viewed the free communication with the Greek port from a mili-
tary-strategic standpoint. With the experience from the Great War during 
which the Salonica front became ingrained in the collective memory of the 
Serbian Army and people, the port remained central to operational think-
ing and military planning of the Yugoslav armed forces. This was facilitated 
by the strategic situation of Yugoslavia which, although a bigger and stron-
82 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, 2/34-45, Eden to Prince Paul, 17 March 1941. 
83 Aprilski rat 1941, vol. II, doc. 89, Letter of the British Minister in Belgrade of 20 
March 1941 to Dragiša Cvetković on the insistence of the British Government to in-
clude a clause that Germany will not attack Salonica in the text of an agreement on the 
adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. 
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ger country than pre-war Serbia, seemed to find herself in a similar position 
in that it was to a large extent encircled by hostile or potentially hostile 
neighbours. In times of peace, the unimpeded exit to Salonica was needed 
to secure a free flow of the military equipment which Yugoslavia could not 
produce herself, whereas in times of war it could also serve as a retreat route 
to a fallback position where a contact could be made with and material help 
received from her (old) allies. Such significance of Salonica was convinc-
ingly demonstrated during the turbulent times on the eve of and during the 
Second World War. Italy, Germany and Britain in turn tried to use Salonica 
as a bait in order to win Yugoslavia over for their intended actions in the 
Balkans. There was, however, no enthusiasm in Belgrade for those offers 
which incited the lust for territorial aggrandisement. To be sure, Yugoslavia 
did strike a deal on Salonica with the Germans, but it was somewhat ten-
tative and only meant as reassurance so that the port would not fall in the 
hands of some other hostile or potentially hostile power. In fact, Yugoslavia’s 
behaviour during those perilous times provides evidence that for her the 
Greek port was indeed, as Ninčić once described it, a matter of security.       
UDC 327(497.11:100)»1919/1941»:339.543.624 Thessaloniki
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